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ILLINOIS CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ACT
Leslie J. Miller*
In September, 1977, Illinois joined the ranks of those states
which have accorded separate statutory treatment to close corpo-
rations. In this Article, the author reviews the principal problem
areas of close corporations and analyzes the Illinois Act's effective-
ness in solving these problems. Because the Act may generate some
new difficulties, the author points out how the statute could be
improved by amendment.
Traditionally, courts and corporate statutes in the United States
have not distinguished sharply between publicly held and close cor-
porations. Consequently, legal principles developed for the former
have been applied to the latter without adequate adjustment for the
differences between the two forms of corporate enterprise. Often, the
result of this tendency has been the denial to shareholders of close
corporations of their right to enter into business arrangements which
adequately protect their interests.
On September 15, 1977, Governor Thompson signed into law the
Illinois Close Corporation Act.' The Act, which became effective
October 1, 1977, is designed to respond to the special problems of
close corporations by allowing substantial flexibility in their manage-
ment. If all of its provisions are utilized, the shareholders of such
corporations would be able to arrange their business affairs as if they
were partners while retaining the limited liability of corporate share-
holders. The Act thus provides a useful tool to attorneys who rep-
resent close corporations or their shareholders. However, it also
contains a number of ambiguities and potential traps for the unwary
practitioner.
The purpose of this Article is to identify and analyze problems
which may be faced by attorneys who organize close corporations
under the Act. A secondary purpose is to suggest changes which
might enhance the usefulness of the Act in dealing with the needs of
close corporations. The Article will begin by reviewing the treatment
* Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., University of Montana, M.A., Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, J.D., University of Iowa.
1. The Close Corporation Act, Pub. Act No. 80-672, 1977 I11. Legis. Serv. 1185 (West) (to
be codified in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 201) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the Close
Corporation Act or the Act].
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of close corporations in state law, and in particular, Illinois law in
order to identify the problems which the Act presumably was in-
tended to correct.2 It then will analyze the provisions of the Act in
detail, comparing them where relevant, with other close corporation
statutes. 3
I. TREATMENT OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW
A. Principles Justifying Distinct Treatment
of Close Corporations
Many of the legal problems of close corporations stem from the fact
that close corporations traditionally have been "governed by the same
laws which were designed to provide for the wholly dissimilar needs
of the public issue corporation." 4  Because such laws were designed
for publicly held corporations they prescribe a form of doing business
unsuitable or even "seriously disadvantageous in a closely held enter-
prise." 5 These laws often prevent the shareholders of a close corpo-
ration from reaching agreements which will protect their interests
adequately, and may lead to such an agreement being held invalid
should litigation occur. 6 In order to understand how this situation
2. See notes 4-115 and accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 116-196 and accompanying text infra.
4. Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 700, 704 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as N.Y.U. Note]. See also Ginsberg, The Need for
Special Close Corporation Legislation in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1975) [hereinafter
referred to as Ginsberg]; Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432, 432-33 (1956) [hereinafter referred to as Latty]. See
generally Symposium Legal Reform for Small Businesses, 33 Bus. LAW. 847 (1978).
Not all corporations, of course, fit neatly into the "publicly held" or "close corporation"
categories. For example, in a number of corporations, a large portion of the shares will be
publicly held, but a majority or controlling block of shares will be held by a small number of
individuals, often members of a single family, or by another corporation. Such a situation often
results from a decision of a close corporation or its shareholders to "go public"; that is, to issue
new shares or sell a portion of the outstanding shares to the public, see, e.g., Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded 429 U.S. 881
(1976); from market purchases of shares of a publicly held corporation as part of a takeover plan,
see, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 429 U.S. 814 (1977); or from purchases of shares
pursuant to a tender offer, see, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)
(involving both tender offers and market purchases). In general, courts have treated such cor-
porations more like publicly held than like close corporations. However, in the context of"going
private" transactions, in which the controlling shareholders attempt to squeeze out the minority
and gain (or regain) complete control of the corporation, a number of courts have imposed a
fiduciary duty on the controlling shareholders. See note 95 and accompanying text infra. The
duty is similar in some respects to the fiduciary duties which some recent cases have imposed
on controlling shareholders of close corporations. See notes 78-95 and accompanying text infra.
5. O'Neal, Foreword to N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 700.
6. See generally Latty, supra note 4, at 432-37; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 701, 718-20.
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developed, it is necessary to review some of the attributes of the
publicly held corporation and the ways in which they have shaped
corporate law.
By definition, a publicly held corporation has a relatively large
number of shareholders. 7 The stock of such corporations generally is
freely traded, either on an exchange or over-the-counter. 8 Further-
more, many shareholders are investors whose primary interest in the
corporation is the possibility of receiving dividends or profits from
appreciation in the value of their shares. 9  Therefore, most
shareholders are not engaged actively in the management of the en-
terprise, 10 and in many cases the corporation is managed "by persons
who own little or no stock in the company." 11
Because of the division between ownership and management of
publicly held corporations, "legal regulation of public issue corpora-
tions has been focused on protecting investors against the excesses of
management and affording investors an opportunity to have a real
voice in corporate affairs." 12 These goals are pursued by a number
of means.13 A fundamental protection is periodic 14 shareholder elec-
tion of the directors who are responsible for the management of the
affairs of the corporation. 15 Both the shareholders and the directors
normally reach decisions by majority vote, 16 although larger votes
7. Covington, The Tennessee Corporation Act and Close Corporations for Profit, 43 TENN.
L. REV. 183, 185 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Covington].
8. Id.
9. Id. at 186.
10. Id.
11. Id. See.also N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 711.
12. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 711.
13. This Article does not purport to present a complete list of the means by which such
goals are pursued. For example, one of the most important means by which the interests of
investors in publicly held corporations are protected, is through federal and state securities
regulation. These regulations are not directly relevant to the problems considered here and are
therefore not discussed.
14. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (1975);
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1974).
15. Most state corporation statutes contain a requirement that "[t]he business and affairs of
a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors." Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.33 (1975). Some recent corporation statutes, for example, CAL. CORP.
CODE § 300 (West 1977), and recent amendments to older statutes, such as the Delaware
General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974), provide that the corpora-
tion's business shall be managed "by" or "under the direction of" the directors. For a discussion
of cases applying this rule to close corporations, see note 32 infra..
16. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.31, 157.37
(1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 251(c), 275(b)
(1974).
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may be required 17 or permitted 18 in certain circumstances. In gen-
eral, courts have looked with disfavor upon unanimous voting re-
quirements, both because such requirements deviate from the major-
ity rule principle19 and because, as a practical matter, unanimity
would be impossible to achieve and would make deadlock inevita-
ble. 20
A second protection is the requirement of strict adherence to cor-
porate formalities regarding such matters as the holding of meet-
ings, 21 quorums, 22 taking decisions by formal resolutions, 23 and re-
17. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 157.64, 157.76(c)
(1975) (approval of holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares necessary for consoli-
dation, merger or dissolution of the corporation).
18. Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.31, 157.37, 157.146
(1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(4), 141(b) 216
(1974).
In most states, it is not clear whether statutory provisions authorizing articles or by-laws
which require a larger than majority vote for shareholder or director action would authorize
requiring an unanimous vote. A former New York statute which provided that action by the
shareholders and directors would be by majority vote unless the articles provide otherwise was
held to preclude, as a matter of public policy, unanimous vote requirements in either the
by-laws, see Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), or the articles.
Eisenstadt Bros. Inc. v. Eisenstadt, 89 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The present New York
provision, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977), was intended to over-
rule such decisions, see 1 F. ONEAL, CLOSE CORPOR.ATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.76 (2d
Ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL], and the validity of unanimous vote requirements in the
articles of incorporation of New York corporation seems well established. See Fromkin v. Mer-
ral Realty, Inc., 30 Misc.2d 288, 295-96, 215 N.Y.S.2d 525, 532-34 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The Dela-
ware Chancery Court has expressed doubt whether a provision similar to that in the present
Delaware statute would authorize a unanimous shareholder vote requirement, Sellers v. Joseph
Bancroft & Sons Co., 23 Del. Ch. 13, 26, 2 A.2d 108, 114 (1938). Two Illinois cases, Moss v.
Waytz, 4 III. App.2d 296, 124 N.E.2d 91 (1955) and Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill. App. 343
(1926), have upheld unanimous vote requirements i shareholders' agreements. In Moss, the
provision for a unanimous vote of the directors in a preincorporation agreement was upheld
even though the by-laws provided for a majority vote. It thus appears likely that unanimous
vote requirements in the articles of incorporation or by-laws of an Illinois corporation would be
upheld.
19. See note 18 supra. The courts often have stated that the principle of majority rule is
fundamental to the law of corporations. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20
1ll.2d 208, 215, 170 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1960); Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197,
207-08, 32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 118-19, 60 N.E.2d
829, 831 (1945); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 335, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1944) ("Corporations
were invented to circumvent the unity required in partnerships."). Some courts have even been
hostile, in the absence of specific statutory sanction, to requirements for less than unanimous,
higher than majority votes. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Firestone, 192 So.2d 298 (Fla. App. 1966).
20. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 119, 60 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1945); Kaplan v.
Block, 183 Va. 327, 335, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1944).
21. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.26, 157.40
(1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 211 (1974 &
1978] CLOSE CORPORATIONS
ports to shareholders. 24 Such formalities serve two basic purposes.
First, they provide a record of corporate action by which the
shareholders can determine whether the directors and officers have
been fulfilling their management functions adequately. 25  Second, the
requirement that decisions by directors be taken at formal meetings
helps insure that there are "a consultation and interchange of views in
order that the combined wisdom and business acumen of the direc-
tors may be utilized for the benefit of those whom they represent." 26
A third protection strictly limits the power of shareholders to run
the corporation by favoring director management. Given the large
number of shareholders in a publicly held corporation, direct man-
agement by the shareholders would be impractical. Furthermore, the
typical shareholder is neither an expert in the business of the corpo-
Supp. 1977). Under most modern corporation statutes, both the shareholders and the directors
may take action by unanimous written consent without a meeting. See note 102 infra.
22. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.31, 157.37
(1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 216 (1974).
23. State corporation statutes generally require that corporations maintain books and records
and that such records be open to inspection by shareholders. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corpo-
ration Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974). Such statutes do not specify the forms in which such records
are to be maintained. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 2187-93 (rev. perm. ed. 1967 & Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as FLET-
CHER]. However, a relatively standard format for corporation resolutions has developed that is
routinely followed, at least by publicly held corporations. In addition, standard forms of resolu-
tions, such as resolutions authorizing bank accounts, are sometimes provided by third parties
with which the corporation does business. Formats for other kinds of records may be deter-
mined by various factors, including generally accepted accounting principles and rules and reg-
ulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies.
24. The most important source of law in this area is the proxy regulations, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-1 to 240.14c-101 (1977), issued under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.. §
78a (1970).
25. This is one of the main reasons for allowing shareholders the right to inspect the corpo-
ration's books and records. FLETCHER, supra note 23 at § 2213.
26. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 711. Courts have often stated the principle that:
[s]tockholders are entitled to the exercise of the free and honest judgment of their
directors upon conditions as they arise and bear upon the interests of the company.
To bargain away in advance for their own profit the judgment the law contemplates
they shall exercise at subsequent official meetings for the company's interests on
conditions as they arise for consideration, is incompatible with a faithful and just
performance of their official duties, and with the fiduciary relationship of their posi-
tion.
Teich v. Kaufman, 174 II1. App. 306, 312 (1912).
This principle often has been cited in cases holding agreements among directors invalid, id. at
315; Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 25, 64 N.E.2d 439, 440 (1946); Burnett v. Word, Inc.,
412 S.W.2d 792, 795 (1967), and in cases which hold invalid shareholder agreements infringing
upon the management discretion of the directors. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y.
323, 328, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (1934); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322, 119 N.E. 559, 562
(1918). See note 32 infra.
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ration nor sufficiently involved in the day to day operations of the
business to be an effective manager. 27  Therefore, the typical corpo-
ration statute limits the role of the shareholders to electing direc-
tors 28 and voting on such fundamental changes as amendments to the
articles of incorporation, 29 consolidations and mergers, 30 and dissolu-
tion of the corporation. 31  Moreover, traditionally courts have held
that statutes requiring management by the directors preclude agree-
ments among shareholders restricting the discretion of directors. 32
Few commentators would argue that the legal principles discussed
above are inappropriate for the publicly held corporation. However,
these principles are wholly inappropriate for the close corporation for
27. Covington, supra note 7, at 186.
28. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (1975);
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1974 & Supp. 1977).
Some statutes also authorize removal of directors by the shareholders.
29. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.53 (1975);
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(1) (1974).
30. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.64 (1975);
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1974).
31. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.75, 157.76
(1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 559, 608-11, 123 A.2d 893, 898-900
(1956), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Long Park, Inc,
v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters, Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 178-79, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948);
McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 329-30, 189 N.E. 234, 236-37 (1934). Similar results have
been reached in other cases by holding an agreement void because it binds the shareholders in
their capacity as directors (see cases cited in note 26 supra); by holding that the corporate
shareholders may not enter into an agreement to be "partners inter sese and a corporation as to
the rest of the world," Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 598-99, 75 A. 568, 571 (Ct. Er. &
App. 1910); by holding that an agreement which takes away from a stockholder freedom to
exercise his judgment on behalf of the corporation is void, Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24,
25-26, 64 N.E.2d 439, 440 (1946); Hellier v. Achorn, 255 Mass. 273, 280, 151 N.E. 305, 307
(1926); and by holding that the agreement was binding upon the parties in their capacity as
shareholders, but not in their capacity as directors or officers, Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138
Conn. 18, 22, 81 A.2d 442, 444 (1951), or upon the corporation. Id. at 443-44. See also
Hladovec v. Paul, 222 I11. 254, 262-63, 78 N.E. 619, 622 (1906).
Even in the older cases, some courts have been willing to tolerate "slight" restrictions on the
power of the directors, Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 417, 199 N.E. 641, 643 (1936); Kaplan v.
Block, 183 Va. 327, 336-37, 31 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1944) (dictum), so long as such agreements do
not in effect legislate the directors out of office, id., or create a "sterilized" board of directors.
Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters, Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 178-79, 77 N.E.2d 633,
634-35 (1948). See also E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkett, 157 Neb. 867, 878-82, 62 N.W.2d
288, 297-99 (1954). The line between permissible and impermissible agreements under such
cases is, however, difficult to determine. See Latty, supra note 4, at 436-37; N.Y.U. Note,
supra note 4, at 707, 719-20, and shareholders can seldom be certain that a particular agree-
ment will be upheld.
For a discussion of newer cases which adopt a more permissive attitude toward shareholders'
agreements, see notes 60-64 and accompanying text infra.
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
a number of reasons. First, the division between ownership of the
shares and management does not exist in a close corporation. The
close corporation has relatively few shareholders- often only two or
three 33 - who frequently are also the directors and officers of the
corporation. 34 Often the shareholders are employees of the corpora-
tion and rely on such employment for a major portion of their in-
come. 35  Thus the reasons for limiting the management role of the
shareholders of a publicly held corporation do not exist in the close
corporation. 36
Second, unlike the shareholder of a public corporation, the
shareholder in a close corporation is normally in a position to
negotiate arrangements for management with the other shareholders.
Such arrangements commonly include agreements that each
shareholder will be permanently retained as a director or officer of
the corporation, provisions giving minority shareholders a veto over
certain corporate actions, restrictions on the transfer of shares of the
corporation, and provisions governing division of profits and declara-
tion of dividends. 37 Such arrangements are particularly essential to
protect the interests of minority shareholders, 38 who would be com-
pletely at the mercy of the majority if subjected to unrestricted
majority rule. 39 Yet such arrangements often have been struck down
by courts 40 in the name of legal principles which were designed to
protect the interests of minority shareholders in publicly held corpo-
rations.
Third, the shareholders and directors of close corporations often
tend to ignore the corporate formalities prescribed for publicly held
corporations. 41 In general, the shareholders of close corporations
33. Galler v. Galler, 32 Il.2d 16, 26-27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); Covington, supra
note 7, at 187.
34. Caller v. Caller, 32 Ill.2d 16, 28-29, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); N.Y.U. Note, supra
note 4, at 711.
35. Covington, supra note 7, at 188; Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 13.
36. Latty, supra note 4, at 432-33; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 712.
37. See generally, Covington, supra note 7, at 188; O'Neal, Foreword to N.Y.U. Note,
supra note 5, at 700-01.
38. Galler v. Caller, 32 Ill.2d 16, 27-28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965); N.Y.U. Note,
supra note 4, at 718.
39. Latty, supra note 4, at 435.
40. See note 4 supra.
41. Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 23; Latty, supra note 4, at 453; Miller & Robinson, Re-
quirements and Limitations Imposed by Corporate Law, in CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 5-1,
5-45, 5-48 (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Robinson].
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are, in their relation to each other, more like partners than like
shareholders of a publicly held corporation. 42  The shareholders are
normally engaged in the business and in frequent contact with each
other. 43 Accordingly, there are seldom any outside directors to con-
sult, 44 and decisions typically are taken without formal meetings.
Since the shareholders often have agreed that certain persons will be
directors and officers, annual meetings of shareholders and directors
may not be held. 45 Given the partner-like relationship among the
shareholders of the close corporation, such informality is appro-
priate.46 However, under existing law it can create problems because
informality can contribute directly to a court's "piercing the corporate
veil" and holding that the shareholders have lost the protection of
limited liability. 47
B. Treatment of Close Corporations as Sui Generis
Increasingly, courts and legislatures have become aware of the
need to develop legal norms suited to the distinct needs of the close
corporation. This awareness is reflected in three significant legal
trends: the increased willingness of courts to allow departures from
traditional corporate norms in cases involving close corporations; 48
the addition of provisions to the general corporation law of most
states to deal with the problems of close corporations; 49 and the
adoption in several states of separate statutes for close corporations.
50
1. Case Law
The courts' liberalized attitudes toward close corporations can be
seen in four areas. First, courts are becoming aware of the vulnerable
position and corresponding need for special protection of shareholders
in a closely held corporation. 51 Second, courts are becoming more
willing to uphold agreements among shareholders which infringe
upon the management discretion of directors. 52 Third, courts are
beginning to impose greater fiduciary duties upon majority share-
42. See generally authorities cited in note 4 supra.
43. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
44. Even if there is an outside director, the shareholders will often make decisions infor-
mally without consulting him. Miller & Robinson, supra note 41, at 5-43.
45. Id. at 5-48.
46. See N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 711.
47. See generally 1 O'Neal, supra note 18, at § 1.10.
48. See notes 51-106 and accompanying text infra.
49. See notes 107-118 and accompanying text infra.
50. See notes 119-123 and accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text infra.
52. See notes 60-67 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 27:587
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holders in close corporations. 53 Fourth, the courts are allowing de-
parture from rigid corporate formalities in cases involving close
corporations. 54
The extreme vulnerability of minority shareholders in close corpo-
rations has been noted in a number of recent cases. This vulnerability
stems from the fact that a substantial portion of the minority's assets
often are invested in the corporation. 55  It also appears in the minor-
ity's frequent dependence upon employment by the corporation for
their livelihood. 56 Finally, they remain vulnerable because the
shares of most close corporations57 lack marketability. Unless re-
strained by an agreement among the shareholders or by a judicial
concept of fiduciary duty, the majority may deprive the minority of
any substantial return on its investment by discharging them from
corporate employment and withholding dividends. 58  And, since
there generally is no market for the shares, the minority shareholder
who is dissatisfied with corporate management may be unable to
liquidate his investment and reinvest in another business, 59 unless he
is willing to accept whatever price the majority offers for his shares.
53. See notes 72-84 and accompanying text infra.
54. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text infra.
55. Caller v. Caller, 32 1ll.2d 16, 27-28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1965).
56. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass.
1975).
57. Caller v. Caller, 32 Ill.2d 16, 27-28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); Davin v. Belmont
Industries, Inc., 40 Mich. App. 672, 677, 199 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1972). See also Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Company, 1 Cal.3d 93, 114, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 604, 460 P.2d 464, 476 (1969).
58. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14
(Mass. 1975); Davin v. Belmont Industries, Inc., 40 Mich. App. 672, 677-78, 199 N.W.2d 542,
544 (1972). See Caller v. Caller, 32 lll.2d 16, 27-28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1964).
59. See authorities cited in note 57 supra. One possible means for a majority shareholder to
reclaim his investment is by judicial dissolution of the corporation. Under Illinois law, such a
remedy is available, inter alia, when "the acts of the directors or those in control of the corpora-
tion are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a)(3) (1975). Illinois
courts, however, consider judicial dissolution to be "a drastic remedy" that "must not be lightly
invoked." Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 1ll.2d 566, 576, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (1957).
In Central Standard, the court held dissolution improper, even though the minority preferred
shareholders had been paid no dividends since 1931 and dividend arrearages totaled over
$1,000,000. Id. at 569, 141 N.E.2d at 47. In Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Iil.
App.2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962), dissolution was denied even though the corporation had
incurred substantial losses over the past several years, the motion picture theater which was the
corporation's major asset had been closed, the controlling shareholder was paid $6,000 per year
as president of the corporation, and his wife held a mortgage on the corporation's real estate.
Id. at 33-34, 184 N.E.2d at 794. It thus appears that, despite the granting of dissolution in some
,ecent cases, see C. MURDOCK, THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 488-89
(3d ed. 1975), judicial dissolution should be considered too "uncertain, expensive and painful"
to be a satisfactory solution. Howe, Corporate Divorce: Deadlocks in the Close Corporation, 22
Bus. LAw 469, 476 (1967).
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One of the ways in which minority shareholders can receive protec-
tion is by a shareholder agreement as to various aspects of corporate
policy. 60 In recent years, the courts have been increasingly willing
to uphold such agreements. Perhaps the leading case is Galler v.
Galler,61 in which the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a shareholders'
agreement which specified the directors, provided for payment of
minimum annual dividends, and directed the corporation to continue
salary payments to the surviving spouse of either shareholder. 62 The
court noted that "shareholder agreements similar to that in question
here are often, as a practical consideration, quite necessary for the
protection of those financially interested in the close corporation." 63
Therefore, it concluded that where
no injury to a minority interest appears, no fraud or apparent in-
jury to the public or creditors is present, and no clearly prohibitory
statutory language is violated, we can see no valid reason for pre-
cluding the parties from reaching any agreements concerning the
management of the corporation which are agreeable to all."
Cases such as Galler are a definite improvement over the older
cases in which shareholders' agreements restricting the directors'
management discretion routinely were held invalid. Even under
Galler, however, the shareholders may not be completely free to
reach advance agreement on how to run the corporation. In Somers
v. AAA Temporary Services, Inc.,65 the Illinois appellate court held
that while "[s] light deviations from corporate norms may be permit-
ted" under Galler, "action by the shareholders which is in direct, con-
travention of the statute cannot be allowed." 66 Therefore, the
Somers court voided a by-law amendment passed by the shareholders
rather than by the directors. 67 In addition, there is still judicial op-
60. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
61. 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965).
62. Id. at 20-22, 203 N.E.2d at 580-81.
63. Id. at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 583.
64. Id. at 30, 203 N.E.2d at 585. See also Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967) (similar agreements upheld under the laws of Florida, Tennessee
and Ohio); and Holden v. Construction Mach. Co., 202 N.W.2d 348 (1973) (Iowa Supreme
Court held that an agreement between two sole shareholders that they would continue to be
employed by the corporation and receive equal compensation "was effected for and on behalf
of" the corporation and was therefore "binding upon the corporation.").
65. 5 I11. App.3d 931, 284 N.E'2d 462 (1st Dist. 1972).
66. Id. at 935, 284 N.E.2d at 465.
67. Id. It should be noted that the requirement that directors rather than shareholders
amend by-laws does not appear on the face of the statute to be more mandatory than the
requirement, that the corporation's business be managed by the directors, which was arguably
violated by the agreement in Caller.
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position to agreements restricting the management discretion of di-
rectors and agreements among directors. 68 Such opposition may re-
surface in future Illinois cases. Thus the extent to which agreements
among shareholders are permissible is still not entirely clear, and
statutory clarification is desirable.
A third way in which courts have liberalized their treatment of
close corporations has been by imposing greater fiduciary duties upon
controlling shareholders 69 and, in one case, 70 directors of close cor-
porations. Although often it has been held that a majority shareholder
has a fiduciary duty to the corporation, 7' absent special cir-
cumstances 72 courts have been reluctant to hold that a majority
shareholder has a fiduciary relationship vis-a-vis minority sharehold-
ers. 73  Thus it has been held that a majority shareholder does not
owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders merely because of his
stock ownership. 74 Nor are shareholders restricted in their freedom
to vote stock in accordance with their own interests. 7 Where such a
fiduciary duty has been held to exist, the duty imposed has been
considerably less strict than that imposed on partners and parties to
joint ventures.76 As a result,
The Somers case is not the first case in which a court has at least arguably retreated from a
more liberal position regarding shareholder agreements. Compare Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-
New Brunswick Theaters Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948), with Clark v. Dodge, 269
N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
68. See note 26 supra.
69. In general, such duties will be imposed upon a shareholder or shareholders owning the
majority of the corporation's voting shares. But see Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-87
(D.C. Cir. 1957), in which the minority shareholder of a close corporation was held to have
violated a fiduciary duty to the majority shareholder. See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 n.17 (Mass. 1975).
70. Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 491-92, 335 N.E.2d 334, 337-38 (1975).
71. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142,
146 (4th Cir. 1970).
72. See FLETCHER, supra note 23, at § 5811 (rev. perm. ed. 1970).
73. See generally, Comment, The Expanding Scope of the Controlling Shareholder's
Fiduciary Duty to the Minority Shareholders: Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson and Co., 1969 U. 111.
L.F. 534 [hereinafter cited as 11. Comment].
74. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v.
Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) (Kansas law); Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9,
105 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1952); Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, 3 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 165
N.Y.S.2d 745, 750, 144 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1957).
75. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Del. 1977);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 22 Del. Ch. 610, 622, 53
A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947); Blinn v. Riggs, 110 II1. App. 37, 48 (1903).
76. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16
(Mass. 1975).
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the traditional theories of fiduciary obligation as tests of majority
shareholder responsibility to the minority . . . have failed to afford
adequate protection to minority shareholders and particularly to
those in closely held corporations whose disadvantageous and often
precarious position renders them particularly vulnerable to the
vagaries of the majority. 77
A recent trend, however, is to impose on controlling shareholders,
particularly in close corporations, a fiduciary duty toward other
shareholders. Some courts have even held that such a duty is equiv-
alent to that between partners. In some cases, this result is reached
by holding that the parties are conducting "a joint venture in corpo-
rate form," and therefore have the same duties to each other as do
partners. 78  In other cases, the holding has been stated in a more
general form applicable to all close corporations.
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Company 79 is an example. The major-
ity shareholders of a closely held savings and loan association or-
ganized a holding company to which they transferred their shares. 80
They then arranged a public offering of the holding company shares,
leaving the minority with shares of the operating company for which
there was no market. 8 ' Under the traditional rules, the minority
would not have been able to obtain relief.82 This was particularly
true because the transactions did not alter the minority's position
with regard to marketability of the shares and control of the corpora-
tion. 8 However, the Jones court held that the appropriate standard
was whether the majority had acted with "inherent fairness from the
viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein." 84 It
found that the majority had violated this duty by disposing of its own
stock on terms not made available to the minority. 1
77. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.3d 93, 111, 460 P.2d 464, 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
601 (1969).
78. Wilson v. Jennings, 344 Mass. 608, 614-15, 184 N.E.2d 642, 646 (1962). See also, John
v. Oster, 44 Wis.2d 623, 628-33, 172 N.W.2d 12, 15-17 (1969).
79. 1 Cal.3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
80. Id. at 102-03, 460 P.2d at 467, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
81. Id. at 105, 460 P.2d at 469, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
82. Id. at 112, 460 P.2d at 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
83. See Ill. Comment, supra note 73, at 540.
84. 1 Cal.3d 93, 110, 460 P.2d 464, 472, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (1969).
85. Id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604. It should be noted that, although, the
standard of conduct promulgated by the Jones court is applicable to "officers, directors and
controlling shareholders" of all corporations, id. at 110, 460 P.2d at 472-73, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
600-01, its actual holding was limited to close corporations:
[W]e do not suggest that the duties of corporate fiduciaries include in all cases an
obligation to make a market for and to facilitate public trading in the stock of the
corporation. But when, as here, no market exists, the controlling shareholders may
[Vol. 27:587
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In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 8 the minority shareholders
of a close corporation challenged the corporation's purchase of the
shares of the former controlling shareholder. 87 The court began by
noting that, for those reasons discussed previously, 8 8 minority
shareholders of close corporations are in particular need of protection
from oppression by the majority. 8 9 Because of this need for protec-
tion, the court held that "stockholders in the close corporation owe
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty . . . that partners
owe to one another." 90 This duty required the controlling
shareholders to afford the minority the opportunity to sell their shares
on the same terms as those extended to the majority. 9'
Cases such as Jones and Donahue provide substantial protection for
minority shareholders in close corporations. Cases in other jurisdic-
tions, however, still deny that such duties exist 92 or impose lesser
duties on the minority. In Tanzer v. International General Indus-
tries, Inc., 93 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court held that al-
though a merger caused by a majority shareholder solely for the pur-
pose of squeezing out the minority for cash would violate the major-
ity's fiduciary duty, 94 such a merger would not violate the duty if, in
addition to squeezing out the minority, it served a bona fide business
purpose of the majority. 95 Thus it is uncertain in light of such cases
not use their power to control the corporation for the purpose of promoting a mar-
keting scheme that benefits themselves alone to the detriment of the minority.
Id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
It thus appears that the recognition that shareholders of close corporations require a greater
degree of legal protection than those of publicly held corporations was an important element in
the court's decision. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
86. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
87. Id. at 508-09.
88. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
89. 328 N.E.2d at 512-15.
90. Id. at 515-16.
91. Id. at 520-21.
92. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
93. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
94. Id. at 1123.
95. Id. at 1124. The court previously had decided in Singer v. The Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969 (1977), that a merger solely for squeeze-out purposes would violate the majority's fiduciary
duty. It left open the question of whether the business purpose served by the merger must be
that of the corporation or whether it could be a business purpose of the majority.
At present, it is not entirely clear what overall effect the "going private" cases, such as
Tanzer and Singer, will have on the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders. A number of
such cases have held that a merger solely for the purpose of squeezing out the minority would
violate state law. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (Georgia law); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.2d
120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 50 A.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). In
both Tanzer Econ. Assoc., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc.2d 167, 180-82 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 482-83 (Sup. Ct. 1976) and Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp.,
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whether Jones and Donahue can be relied on in jurisdictions such as
Illinois where the courts have not yet subjected shareholders in close
corporations to such strict fiduciary obligations.
Finally, various courts have upheld actions taken by persons own-
ing all or substantially all of the stock of the corporation despite non-
compliance with corporate formalities. 96  Such cases tend to recog-
nize, as discussed above, 97 that formalities are unnecessary when
stockholders are also the directors and officers of the corporation. 98
Note, however, that such cases often involve the validity of corporate
obligations to third parties, and a different result might be reached if
the corporation were seeking to enforce an obligation owed to it or if
the controversy involved a dispute among shareholders. 99
In conclusion, the cases discussed in this section go a long way
toward liberalizing the law governing close corporations. So far, how-
ever, their number is small and their scope is not always clearly de-
fined. In addition, most jurisdictions, including Illinois, do not yet
have cases which liberalize the law in all of the areas discussed above,
and there is still substantial contrary authority from other jurisdictions
86 Misc.2d 292, 297-98, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957, 962-63 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the court held that the
increased business efficiencies which would result from merging two companies in similar lines
of business would provide a sufficient business purpose to justif~y such a merger. In both cases,
the merger was found to benefit the corporation as well as the controlling shareholder, and in
Tanzer, the court strongly implied that a merger "solely for the benefit of controlling stockhold-
ers" would be disallowed. Id. at 176, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
In Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1280-82 (2d Cir.), vacated, 429 U.S. 881
(1976), and Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1289-91 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 429
U.S. 814 (1977), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a squeeze-out merger that lacks
corporate purpose would also violate § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1970), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Despite the Supreme Court's
reversal of Green on this point, these cases provide indirect support for state law requirements
that squeeze-out mergers promote a business interest of the corporation as well as the control-
ling shareholders. It thus appears that the Delaware Supreme Court's position on this issue is
the minority view at this time.
Except for Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., the "going private" cases have not involved
close corporations in the strict sense. See note 4 supra. Thus such cases, although relevant, may
not be controlling in cases involving fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders of close corpora-
tions.
96. See, e.g., Industrial Equip. Co. v. Montague, 224 S.C. 510, 516, 80 S.E.2d 114, 117
(1954); Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 445-46, 464 P.2d 598, 601 (1970).
97. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
98. But see Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 445-46, 464 P.2d 598, 601 (1970), in which the
court, although recognizing that "the trend of authority is to uphold as binding on the corpora-
tion acts or contracts on its behalf by a person or persons owning all or practically all the stock"
quoting 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1004 at 471 (1940), stated that it did "not approve the method
employed here and certainly denounce it as a pattern to be followed by corporations generally."
99. Cf. Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 598 (1970).
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which has not been overruled. Therefore, such cases do not remove
the need for statutory treatment of the problems of close corpora-
tions.
2. General Corporation Laws
A second way in which corporate law has been adapted to the
needs of the close corporation is by the inclusion of provisions in
general corporation statutes which also are of great utility to close
corporations. Among the most common provisions are those which
permit: higher than majority voting and quorum requirements for
both shareholders and directors; 100 provisions for informal director
and shareholder action by written consent 101 or by conference tele-
phone call; 102 broad power to delegate to committees; 103 broad
power to restrict the transfer of shares; 104 permission for voting
trusts; 105 provisions for one incorporator; 106 permission for one or
two, instead of the traditional three, directors; 107 and broader provi-
sions for dissolution, such as by unanimous consent of the share-
holders. 108
Such provisions afford considerable flexibility in arranging the af-
fairs of a close corporation. 109 In the opinion of some commentators,
they even render specific close corporation statutes unnecessary. 110
Such provisions generally do not, and as a matter of public policy
probably should not,"1 include provisions authorizing management
100. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.31, 157.37,
157.146 (1975); Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(4),
141(b), 216 (1974). See note 18 supra.
101. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.147, 157.147.1 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 141(0, 228(a) (1974).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(i) (1974).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.14 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1974).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.30a (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1974).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.46 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1974).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1974).
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.75 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(c)(1 97 4 ).
109. See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED, § 35, Special Com-
ment-Close Corporations, at 756-59 (2d ed. 1971).
110. See, e.g., Preface, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT at iii (1969 rev.).
111. One commentator stated:
[I] nclusion of provisions drafted primarily for the benefit of close corporations in a
single statutory scheme covering all corporations may prove dangerous. Without
statutory recognition of the close corporation, public issue corporations could avail
themselves of provisions which for reasons of public policy should not be applicable
to such enterprises.
N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 708.
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by the shareholders rather than by a board of directors. Thus if such
provisions are desirable, separate statutory provisions applicable
solely to close corporations still appear necessary.
3. Close Corporation Statutes
The third way in which corporate law has been adapted to the
needs of close corporations is by means of statutory provisions appli-
cable only to close corporations. Such provisions are of two types.
The first type is the separate close corporation statute, 1 12 such as the
Illinois Act." 3 The second provision is contained in the general cor-
poration law and either authorizes agreements among shareholders or
permits articles of incorporation to restrict the management discretion
of the board. This latter form will be permitted if the shares of the
corporation are not listed on a securities exchange or regularly traded
or quoted in an over-the-counter market. 114 Such a provision also
generally shifts liability for managerial acts from the directors to the
112. The oldest close corporation statutes, which date from the nineteenth century, are the
"partnership association" laws of a few northeastern states. MICH. COMP. LAWS §9 449.301-373
(1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:3-1 to 42:6-10 (West 1940); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1783.01-.12; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 12701-93 (Purdon 1966). The Pennsylvania statute was
repealed in 1966 "except as to associations of professional persons not authorized by law to
practice their profession as a corporation." Id. § 2 2 03 (g)(l)-(5). Such statutes require adherence
to the traditional corporate formalities, including a minimum of three partners and three direc-
tors. They thus have no practical advantage over the general corporation laws of such states and
are not widely used. Latty, supra note 4, at 456, n.90.
The first modern close corporation statute was enacted in Florida in 1963. FLA. STAT. ANN.
9 608.70-.77 (West 1973). However, this statute generally was considered to be so poorly
drafted as to create "unnecessary uncertainties as to what corporations are governed by its
provisions and what powers such corporations may possess." Dickson, The Florida Close Corpo-
ration Act: An Experiment That Failed, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 842 (1967). The statute was
repealed in 1975. 1975 Fla. Sess. Laws, ch. 75-250 § 139.
In addition to Illinois, close corporation statutes are currently in effect in Arizona, ARIz. REV.
STAT. §§ 10-201 to -218 (1977); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1974); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 to 17-7216 (1974); Maryland, MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§
4-101 to 4-603 (1974); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1371-76 (Purdon 1967 & Supp.
1977); and Texas, TEX. CORP. & ASS'N CODE ANN. Art. 2.30-1 to 2.30-5 (Vernon 1956). Provi-
sions applicable only to close corporations and similar to those of the typical close corporation
statute are found at various places in the new California General Corporation Law. CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 158, 186, 204(a), 300, 418(c), 421, 706(a), 1111, 1201(e), 1800(a), 1904 (West 1977). See
also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-A, §§ 102.5, 701.2 (1974), which authorize shareholder manage-
ment of corporations with not more than 20 shareholders.
113. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.107 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-611 (1977);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:5-21 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1964); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1970) (limited to 30 shareholders); S.C.
CODE § 12-16.22 (1970). A similar provision regarding shareholders' agreements in the Tennes-
see General Corporation Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-714 (Supp. 1977) is not limited to
shareholders of close corporations.
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shareholders "to the extent that and so long as the discretion or pow-
ers of the board . . . are controlled by any such agreement." 115
Provisions of various close corporation statutes will be discussed
further in connection with the analysis of the Illinois Act in the next
.section.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS CLOSE CORPORATION ACT
This section of this Article will examine the provisions of the
Illinois Act in detail, for three purposes: to introduce Illinois attor-
neys to the Act by indicating ways in which the Act may prove useful to
their practice; to identify ambiguities and problems in the drafting of
the Act; and to make suggestions for improvements which might be
adopted by future legislatures. Such examination will include both an
analysis of the specific provisions of the Act and comparison with al-
ternative provisions in close corporation acts of other states.
A. Relationship to the Business Corporation Act
The Close Corporation Act does not entirely displace the Business
Corporation Act as the law governing close corporations, nor does it
apply to all "close corporations" as that term generally is under-
stood, 116 but only to those corporations that elect to be subject to the
Act. n 7  In addition, corporations which do not elect to be subject to
the Act, and close corporations which have voluntarily or involuntar-
ily terminated close corporation status, remain subject to the Business
Corporation Act "except insofar as this Act otherwise provides." 118
Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, it is not always clear to
what extent the Act "otherwise provides." 119
B. Definition of Close Corporation2 0
The Act defines a "close corporation" as follows:
Section 3. Close Corporation Defined; Contents of Articles of
Incorporation.
115. See Miller & Robinson, supra note 41, at 5-35.
116. See Caller v. Caller, 32 Il1.2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1964); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).
117. Act of Sept. 15, 1977, Pub. Act 80-672, § 2(a), 1977 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1185 (to be codified
in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 1204).
118. Close Corporation Act § 2(b).
119. See the discussion of the provisions regarding judicial dissolution, notes 143-152 and
accompanying text infra.
120. Several commentators have cited the difficulty of defining a close corporation as a major
reason for not adopting a separate close corporation statute. Folk, The Model Act and the South
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(a) A close corporation is a corporation organized under or
electing to be subject to this Act the articles of incorporation of
which contain the provisions required by Section 47.1 through
47.15, inclusive, of The Business Corporation Act, as now or
hereafter amended, and, in addition, provide that all of the issued
shares of each class shall be subject to one or more of the following
restrictions on transfer which restrictions shall be uniform within
each class:
(1) Obligates a shareholder to offer to the corporation or to
one or more shareholders of the corporation or to any desig-
nated person or to any combination of the foregoing, a prior
opportunity to acquire such shares; or
(2) Requires the corporation or the holders of shares of any
class of the corporation to consent to any proposed transferee
of the shares; or
(3) Prohibits the transfer of such shares to designated per-
sons or classes of persons, and such designation if not man-
ifestly unreasonable; or
(4) Prohibits a transfer of the shares if the transfer would
cause the corporation to lose its status as an electing small
business corporation under subchapter S of the United States
Internal Revenue Code; or
(5) Imposes any other lawful restriction on transfer or reg-
istration of transfer of shares.
(b) The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may set
forth the qualifications of shareholders, either by specifying classes
of persons who shall be entitled to be holders of record of shares of
any class, or by specifying classes of persons who shall not be enti-
tled to be holders of shares of any class, or both.
This definition differs substantially from those in other close corpo-
ration statutes. Other statutes generally provide that the shares of a
close corporation may be held of record by no more than a specified
number of persons. 12 1 In addition, some states prohibit a " 'public
offering' within the meaning of the United States Securities Act of
1933" 122 of the corporation's shares.
Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 275, 282 (1963); Latty, supra note 4, at 455-57. As
the ensuing discussion indicates, see notes 121-129 and accompanying text infra, the various
close corporation statutes have not developed a totally adequate or universally accepted solution
to this problem.
121. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West 1977) (10 persons); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1)
(1974), KAN. STAT. § 17-7202(a)(1) (1974) and PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 15, § 1372(A)(1) (Purdon
Supp. 1977) (30 persons); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1.A(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (35
persons).
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(3) (1974); KAN. STAT. § 17-20 2 (a)(3) (1974); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15 § 1372(A)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977). The Texas statute requires a statement in the
articles of incorporation that "no shares ... shall be issued by means of any public offering,
solicitation, or advertisement." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1.A(2) (Vernon Supp.
1978).
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The Illinois Act has both advantages and disadvantages in this re-
spect. Tying close corporation status to the private offering exemption
under section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933123 may, given the
uncertain limits of the exemption, 124 create substantial uncertainty as
to whether some corporations can qualify for such status. 125 Placing
a limit on the number of shareholders also makes possible the loss of
close corporation status due to an increase in the number of
shareholders. Such an increase may be caused by factors completely
extraneous to the corporation's business. These include "the transfer
of shares on distribution by will or pursuant to the laws of descent
and distribution, the dissolution of a partnership or corporation or
business association or the termination of a trust which holds shares,
[or the] dissolution of a marriage ..... 126 However, the absence of
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
124. The private offering exemption exempts from the registration provisions of the Securities
Act "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Id. The term "public offering"
is not defined in the Securities Act, and its content has been the subject of considerable litiga-
tion and commentary. In the leading case, Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119 (1953), the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the Securities Act "is to protect
investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions." Id. at 124. In light of such purpose, the Court felt, the applicability of the section
4(2) exemption "should . . . turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the
protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a
transaction 'not involving any public offering.' " Id. at 125. The Court further noted that the
number of persons to whom an offering is made is not the decisive factor, but that the registra-
tion requirement would "apply to a 'public offering' whether to few or many." Id. See also
Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973), which held that a sale of a total of 20 shares to
three investors was a public offering.
Whether a potential investor is able "to fend for himself" depends upon his access to informa-
tion concerning the issuer, his degree of knowledge and experience in finance and business, and
whether he is able to bear the economic risks of the investment. See generally S.E.C. Rule 146,
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977). Since the levels of wealth and business sophistication which of-
ferees must possess for the offering to qualify for the exemption are not clearly defined, the
exemption's applicability will be subject to doubt in a substantial number of cases. See generally
Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering
Exemptions, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622 (1974); Carney, Exemptions From Securities Registration
for Small Issuers: Shifting From Full Disclosure-Part I: The Private Offering Exemption, Rule
146 and an End to Access for Small Issuers, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 507 (1975); A.B.A.
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Federal Regulation of Securities Commit-
tee, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 485 (1975).
125. According to Professor Folk, the Delaware definition was chosen because it was "sub-
stantially more certain and predictable in application and administration" than the generally
traded in the over-the-counter market test of the North Carolina statute. E. FOLK, THE DELA-
WARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 505 (1972). In light of the
uncertainty of the § 4(2) exemption, such certainty does not appear to have been achieved.
126. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(e) (West 1977). While other statutes are not as explicit as the
California statute in setting forth such contingencies, the problem is nonetheless real. Such
statutes typically provide that shares held jointly by a husband and wife "shall be treated as
held by one stockholder." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(c) (1974); KAN. STAT. § 17-2202(c)
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1372(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977). The Texas Act provides that
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
such restrictions may allow corporations with a substantial number of
shareholders and whose shares are fairly widely traded to elect close
corporation status under the Act. 127  For example, a corporation
whose articles of incorporation prohibit transfer of shares to "persons
not bona fide residents of the State of Illinois" 128 conceivably may
elect close corporation status. Of course, it is possible that Illinois
courts would hold that the Act is not applicable to such corporations.
Also, the Secretary of State might refuse to file articles of incorpora-
tion for a close corporation with such open-ended tranfer restric-
tions. Otherwise, if problems of this sort develop, it may be neces-
sary to amend the Act so as to restrict the number of shareholders, 129
or to prevent a public offering.
The Act contains several provisions which serve to backstop the
effectiveness of the restrictions on transfer. Every certificate repre-
senting shares issued by the corporation must
conspicuously set forth upon the face or back of the certificate
[either] a full statement of all the restrictions on transfer and qual-
ifications of shareholders [or] that such statement . . .will be fur-
nished by the corporation to any shareholder upon request and
without charge. 130
Any person to whom a certificate so legended is issued or assigned is
"conclusively presumed to have notice ...of his ineligibility to be a
shares shall be considered as held by one person if held by a husband and wife jointly or as
community property, "by an estate of a decedent or incompetent," or "by an express trust,
partnership, association, or corporation created or organized and existing other than for the
primary purpose of holding shares ... in a close corporation." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.30-1(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978). It is thus possible under all of such statutes for an event which
may not significantly change the business relationships among the parties to cause loss of close
corporation status.
127. Ginsberg, supra note 4 at 20, commenting on the proposed version of the Illinois Act,
stated that "[t ]here is nothing in the Act which prohibits the corporation or a shareholder from
making a public offer or distribution of his shares without sacrificing the close corporation qual-
ifications."
128. Such a restriction would be designed to take advantage of the "intrastate offering"
exemption in § 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970) and S.E.C.
Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1977).
129. Some of the disadvantages of a numerical restriction could be alleviated by providing
that an increase of up to a specified number over the normal limit due to certain specified
events would not cause loss of close corporation status, or that shareholder agreements would
remain enforceable under such circumstances. Also the number of shareholders allowed could
vary depending on the provision of the statute involved. For example, a larger number of
shareholders could be allowed where there is a shareholders' agreement regarding the manage-
ment of the corporation rather than where the corporation is managed by the shareholders. See
text accompanying note 158 infra.
130. Close Corporation Act § 8(a). See also Uniform Commercial Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
26, § 8-204 (1975).
[Vol. 27:587
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
shareholder [or] that he has acquired shares in violation of a restric-
tion on transfer." 131 Moreover, "the corporation may, at its option,
refuse to register transfer of the shares into the name of the as-
signee." 132 Such provisions, in conjunction with the judicial pro-
ceedings to prevent involuntary loss of close corporation status,
should provide adequate protection against transfer of shares to unau-
thorized persons. 133
It is unclear whether the requirement that some restrictions on
transfer be included in the articles of incorporation is intended to
preclude restrictions in the by-laws or a shareholders' agreement. 134
Until this point is clarified by either the courts or the legislature, all
restrictions on transfer should be included in the articles unless there
are very strong reasons for placing such restrictions in some other
document.
C. Acquisition and Termination of Close Corporation Status
A newly formed corporation may acquire close corporation status
by filing articles of incorporation in accordance with the Business
Corporation Act. The articles must include the restrictions on transfer
of its shares as required by the Act and "a heading stating the name
of the corporation and that it is being organized as a close corpora-
tion." 135 An existing corporation may become a close corporation by
amending its articles of incorporation in accordance with the Close
Corporation Act to include such restrictions on transfer and a "head-
ing stating the name of the corporation and that it is reorganized as a
close corporation." 136 Such an amendment must be approved by
"the holders of record of all the outstanding shares of the corpora-
tion." 137
These provisions are similar to those found in other close corpora-
tion statutes. Prior to its amendment in 1975, the Texas statute
applied to all corporations which met specified criteria, obviating the
131. Close Corporation Act § 8(b).
132. Id. § 8(c). The Act provides that this provision is not applicable if all the shareholders
have consented to the transfer or the corporation has voluntarily terminated close corporation
status. Id. § 8(d). See notes 140-142 and accompanying text infra. The Act does not state
whether the provision would be applicable after close corporation status has been involuntarily
terminated. See notes 143-152 and accompanying text infra.
133. See notes 146-147 and accompanying text infra.
134. Such agreements were generally upheld under prior Illinois law. See cases cited in note
191 infra.
.135. Close Corporation Act § 4.
136. Id. § 5.
137. Id.
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necessity of an election by the corporation or the shareholders. 138
Such an approach may be preferable to the Illinois approach. It
makes available the protections of the Act to shareholders of all close
corporations and avoids confusion as to what law is applicable to those
close corporations that do not elect close corporation status under the
Act. This question will be discussed further in a later section of this
Article. 139
Close corporation status under the Act may be terminated in one of
two ways. Voluntary termination occurs whenever a close corporation
amends its articles to delete the restrictions on transfer required by
the Act. 140 Such an amendment must be approved by "the holders
of record of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class
of the corporation," 141 unless the articles of incorporation require a
larger vote. 142
Involuntary termination of close corporation status occurs whenever
there is a breach of one of the restrictions on transfer and "neither
the corporation nor any of its shareholders proceeds under Section 9
of this Act to prevent such loss of status or to remedy such
breach." 143 Upon the discovery of any breach, "the corporation shall
promptly notify all of the shareholders in writing" both of the breach
and of the shareholders' right to commence an action in the "Circuit
Court of the County in which the registered office of the corporation
is located" to prevent loss of or to restore close corporation status. 144
If the breach is not remedied or such a proceeding commenced
within 90 days after notice, or, if notice is not given, within one year
of the discovery of the breach, the corporation's status as a close cor-
poration shall terminate. 145
There are a number of ambiguities in the involuntary termination
provisions of the Act. It gives the court jurisdiction "to issue all or-
ders necessary . . . to restore its status as a close corporation by . . .
setting aside acts" inconsistent with the transfer restrictions or
shareholder qualification provisions.1 46 Therefore, such a proceeding
apparently could be commenced after termination of close corporation
138. See Covington, supra note 7, at 193-94.
139. See notes 185-196 and accompanying text infra.
140. Close Corporation Act § 7(a).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 7(b).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 9(a), (b).
145. Id. § 9(a).
146. Id. § 9(b).
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status. The Act does not state whether there is any time limit for
commencing such a proceeding after termination of close corporation
status. Nor does it indicate whether such a proceeding can be com-
menced by a shareholder who received timely notice of a breach or
became a shareholder subsequent to the breach. The Act is silent
concerning the court's authority to set aside transfers that are "con-
trary to [the] articles of incorporation" and to restore close corpora-
tion status includes authority to set aside transfers occurring sub-
sequent to the termination of close corporation status. It is unclear
whether a transfer which is set aside is void ab initio or is merely
voidable. 147
Finally, it is not clear what constitutes discovery of a breach of
restriction on transfer. For example, a corporation might register a
transfer of shares without realizing until some years later, if ever, that
the transfer violated a restriction in the articles. The Act gives no
indication whether such violation would be discovered constructively
at the time of the transfer or only discovered when some corporate
agent in fact becomes aware of the violation. This ambiguity will
make it difficult for attorneys to give opinions as to close corporation
status or the validity of shareholders agreement. The ambiguity
should be removed by adding a definition of discovery to the Act.
Another area of uncertainty is the effect that loss of close corpora-
tion status has on the corporation.148 As previously mentioned, the
Act does not state whether restrictions on transfer of shares remain in
effect after termination. 149 In addition, it does not state whether
shareholder agreements authorized by the Act '5 0 are voided by such
termination, or how corporations managed by the shareholders 151
may comply with the Close Corporation Act.' 5 2  These are serious
omissions which, hopefully, the legislature will remedy in the near
future.
In a proceeding to prevent loss or restoration of close corporation
status if the court holds a restriction on transfer invalid, the corpora-
tion shall have an option "to acquire the restricted shares at a price
147. If a transfer is merely voidable, it may result in disqualification of the corporation under
Subehapter S, I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379, by causing the corporation to have an ineligible share-
holder or more than ten shareholders.
148. Presumably, although the Act does not say so, termination of close corporation status
would not result in termination of the corporation's existence or revocation of its certificate of
incorporation. But see Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 35-36.
149. See note 32 supra.
150. See text accompanying note 154 infra.
151. Id.
152. See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 36.
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which is agreed upon by the parties." In the absence of such an
agreement, it may acquire the shares at a price and upon terms de-
termined by the court. 153  Although the Act does not discuss this
question, the judgment holding a restriction invalid would appear to
cause a termination of close corporation status if the articles of incor-
poration contain no other explicit restrictions. A possible solution to
this problem would be to give the shareholders a specified period of
time in which to amend the articles to include alternative restrictions.
Pending such an amendment to the Act, provisions to this effect
probably can be included in any decree in which restrictions are held
to be invalid.
D. Management of the Close Corporation
Perhaps the most important provisions of the Act relate to the
management of the corporation. Such provisions explicitly authorize
shareholders to enter into agreements concerning all aspects of the
management of the corporation. This includes a provision in the arti-
cles of incorporation that the shareholders rather than the directors
shall manage the business of the corporation.
Section 11. Written Agreements as to Conduct of Certain Affairs
of Corporation.
(a) All shareholders of a close corporation may enter into a writ-
ten agreement, relating to any phase of the affairs of the corpora-
tion, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Management of the business of the corporation.
(2) Declaration and payment of dividends or division of
profits.
(3) Who shall be officers or directors, or both, of the cor-
poration.
(4) Restrictions on transfer of shares permitted by Section
3 of this Act.
(5) Voting requirements, including the requirements of
unanimous voting of shareholders or directors.
(6) Employment of shareholders by the corporation.
(7) Arbitration of issues as to which the shareholders are
deadlocked in voting power or as to which the directors are
deadlocked and the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock.
(b) No written agreement to which shareholders of a close cor-
poration have actually assented, whether embodied in the articles
of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation or in any separate
153. Close Corporation Act § 10. Since a restriction could also be declared invalid in other
types of proceedings, the Act should perhaps be amended to provide such an option in all
judicial proceedings.
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written agreement and which relates to any phase of the affairs of
the corporation, whether to the management of its business or di-
vision of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the
parties thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by the parties
thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to
arrange their relationships in a manner that would be appropriate
only between partners.
(c) If the business of a close corporation is managed by a Board
of Directors, an agreement among all of the shareholders, whether
solely among themselves or between all of them and a party who is
not a shareholder, is not invalid, as among the parties thereto, on
the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation as to interfere with the discretion of the Board of Di-
rectors, but the making of such an agreement shall impose upon
the shareholders the liability for managerial acts that is imposed by
the laws of this State upon directors.
Section 12. Management by Shareholders.
(a) The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may pro-
vide that the business of the corporation shall be managed by the
shareholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors.
So long as this provision continues in effect.
(1) No meeting of shareholders need be called to elect di-
rectors;
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise the
shareholders of the corporation shall be deemed to be direc-
tors for purposes of applying provisions of The Business Cor-
poration Act, as now or hereafter amended; and
(3) The shareholders of the corporation shall be subject to
all liabilities of directors.
(b) Such a provision may be inserted in the articles of incorpora-
tion by amendment if all incorporators and subscribers or
shareholders of record authorize such a provision. An amendment
to the articles of incorporation to delete such provision shall be
adopted by a vote of the holders of record of at least two-thirds of
all the outstanding shares of each class of the corporation. If the
articles of incorporation contain a provision authorized by this Sec-
tion 12, the existence of such provision shall be noted conspicu-
ously on the face or back of every certificate representing shares
issued by the corporation. 154
These provisions effect a major change in Illinois law governing
close corporations. The provisions governing shareholders' agree-
ments appear to go well beyond what was authorized by Galler v.
Galler,155 especially as limited by Somers v. AAA Temporary Serv-
ices, Inc., 156 in authorizing shareholder control over the management
154. Agreements under § 11 must also be noted on certificates representing the corporation's
shares. Id. § 8(a).
155. 32 1ll.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
156. 5 Iil. Apl.3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462 (1st Dist. 1972).
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of the corporation. 157 This is particularly true of section 11(c), which
appears to authorize an agreement delegating the management of the
corporation to a person or persons who are neither shareholders nor
directors. Section 12 goes even further by allowing elimination of the
board of directors altogether. Using such provisions, it should be pos-
sible by careful drafting to achieve practically any arrangement for the
control of the corporation which the parties desire.
There are, however, a number of potential problems in the use of
these provisions of which counsel for close corporations should be
aware. First, there is a serious ambiguity in the provision which shifts
liability from the directors to shareholders when an agreement among
the shareholders interferes with the discretion of the directors. If
read literally, section 11(c) seems to say that the making of any
shareholders' agreement which "interfere[s] with the discretion of the
Board of Directors" imposes upon the shareholders all "liability for
managerial acts that is imposed by the laws of this State upon direc-
tors." 158 This may be true, even if there is only slight interference
with the director's discretion. What most close corporation statutes
provide, 159 and what the drafters probably intended, was to impose
liability on shareholders to the extent that such an agreement inter-
feres with the discretion of the directors. Until this provision is
clarified, by either amendment of the Act or judicial construction,
counsel for close corporations should be cautious in using sharehold-
ers' agreements. This is especially true in situations in which some
shareholders will not also be directors and the parties do not intend
these shareholders to share directors' liability.
157. In one respect, the Galler rule may be less restrictive than the Act. Sections 11(a) and
11(c) of the Act authorize agreements among all shareholders of a close corporation. In Galler,
approximately five percent of the shares were owned by a shareholder who was a party to
neither the agreement nor the litigation. 32 Ill.2d at 17-18, 203 N.E.2d at 579. It is thus
arguable, that agreements regarding corporate management among shareholders of corporations
subject to the Act must be unanimous, whereas less than unanimous agreements among
shareholders of other corporations may be upheld under the Galler rule. Such inconsistency
would not, however, be desirable, and it is likely that the courts would find some way to avoid
such a result. One possibility, especially since section 11(b) of the Act appears to authorize less
than unanimous shareholder agreements (quaere whether this is consistent with the unanimity
requirements of sections 11(a) and (c), and whether it is possible to distinguish agreements
authorized by one section from those authorized by the others), is to hold that such agreements
may be upheld at least where the interests of the other shareholders would not be prejudiced.
Or the courts might hold that, despite section 16 of the Act, see text accompanying note 86
infra, the legislature intended to abolish less than unanimous agreements concerning corporate
management among shareholders of all corporations.
158. It is unclear from the Act whether the directors also remain liable for such acts.
159. Miller & Robinson, supra note 41, at 5-35. The wording of the Illinois Act seems to
have been taken from TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-714 (Supp. 1977).
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The imposition of directors' liability on shareholders under sections
11(c) and 12(a)(3) of the Act creates additional dangers for unsuspect-
ing shareholders. Perhaps the most serious danger is the possibility
that shareholders who do not participate directly in the management
of the corporation will become liable for acts of the managing share-
holders. In order to avoid or minimize this danger, attorneys for close
corporations should be extremely careful in drafting shareholder
agreements. Counsel probably should avoid management by the
shareholders when there will be non-managing shareholders. It also
seems likely that a shareholder who attends a meeting at which illegal
action is taken must dissent in the manner prescribed for directors by
the Business Corporation Act 16 0 to avoid liability for such action.
Another potential problem is that a shareholders' agreement re-
garding control of the corporation may cause disqualification of the
corporation as a "small business corporation" under Subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code. 16' A small business corporation is de-
fined as a domestic corporation which does not "have more than one
class of stock." 162 According to the regulations under this section,
[i]f the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not iden-
tical with respect to the rights and interest which they convey in
the control, profits, and assets of the corporation, then the corpora-
tion is considered to have more than one class of stock. Thus, a
difference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation pref-
erences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation. How-
ever, if two or more groups of shares are identical in every respect
except that each group has the right to elect members of the board
of directors in a number proportionate to the number of shares in
each group, they are considered one class of stock.163
At one time, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that dif-
ferences in voting rights stemming from shareholders' agreements, ir-
revocable proxies and voting trusts would create a second class of
stock and disqualify the corporation. 1 64  Following the Tax Court's
decision in the Parker Oil 165 case, however, the Service changed its
position and now holds that differences in voting rights create a sec-
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42.9 (1975). On the other hand, it is likely, although the
Act does not say so, that shareholders with director's liability would be entitled to contribution
from other shareholders and/or directors pursuant to id. § 157.42.11, and could use the good
faith reliance on financial statements defense of id. § 157.42. 10.
161. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
162. id. § 1371(a)(4).
163. Treas. Beg. § 1.1371-1(g) (emphasis added).
164. Rev. Rul. 63-266, 1963-2 C.B. 341.
165. 58 T.C. 985 (1972).
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ond class of stock only if they arise out of the articles of incor-
poration. 166  No shift has occurred in the Service's position regarding
dividend rights and liquidation preferences. Therefore, any such dif-
ferences would appear to create a second class of stock whether they
arise from the articles of incorporation or from a separate agreement.
If the shareholders of a close corporation wish to make an election
under Subchapter S, all differences among the shares as to dividend
rights and liquidation preferences should be avoided. Moreover, any
differences in voting rights should be contained in a shareholders'
agreements rather than in the articles of incorporation.
In addition to the provisions authorizing shareholders' agreement
and management by the shareholders, the Act provides that:
the articles of incorporation of any close corporation may include a
provision granting to any shareholder, or to the holders of any
specified number or percentage of shares of any class, an option to
have the corporation dissolved at will or upon the occurrence of
any specified event or contingency.' 67
Such a provision may be included in the articles by an amendment if
adopted by the unanimous vote of all the shareholders, 168 and is in-
effective "[u]nless noted conspicuously on the face or back of [every]
share certificate." 169 The use of such a provision, in conjunction
with management by the shareholders, would enable the shareholders
to arrange their affairs in all respects as if they were partners, while
maintaining the limited liability of corporate shareholders. The provi-
166. Rev. Rul. 73-611, 1973-2 C.B. 312. The apparent purpose of the one class of stock
requirement was to prevent administrative difficulties stemming from "complication as to the
reporting of income by the stockholders." Parker Oil Co., 58 T.C. 985, 990 (1972). The Parker
Oil case can be read as holding that differences in voting rights are entirely irrelevant to the
achievement of such purpose, see id., and it is possible that differences in voting rights stem-
ming from the articles of incorporation would, in at least some types of cases, be held not to
create a second class of stock. But see id. at 989; Pollack v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 409, 411
(5th Cir. 1968).
So far, there is no authority as to whether management of the corporation by the shareholders
rather than by the directors would create a second class of stock. It is at least arguable that, if
the shareholders hold unequal numbers of shares but each have one vote on corporate manage-
ment, a difference in voting power would have arisen from the articles of incorporation and
created a second class of stock. Such a result would appear to be contrary to the policy behind
the Parker Oil case, especially since such a situation would be in substance the same as if the
shareholders had agreed in a separate contract to elect themselves directors. In the absence of
specific authority on this point, however, the position which the Service would take cannot be
accurately foreseen.
167. Close Corporation Act § 13(a).
168. Id. §13(b).
169. Id. §13(c).
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sion adds substantially to the management flexibility provided by the
Act.
E. Judicial Dissolution of the Close Corporation
The provisions on judicial dissolution in the Act raise serious ques-
tions concerning the relationship of such provisions to the comparable
provisions in the Business Corporation Act. Section 14(a) provides
that:
The Circuit Court of the County in which the registered office of
the corporation is located may entertain a petition of any share-
holder for involuntary dissolution of any close corporation and, at
the hearing, may appoint a receiver or trustee of the corporation
and order it dissolved when it is made to appear that
(1) the directors or shareholders of the corporation are dead-
locked in the management of the corporate affairs and, in the case
of directors, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, or
that the shareholders are otherwise deadlocked; and
(2) any remedy, including arbitration, provided in any written
agreement of the shareholders upon deadlock has failed to elimi-
nate such deadlock; and
(3) there is such internal dissension among the shareholders of
the corporation that the business and affairs can no longer be con-
ducted in the best interests of the shareholders.
These provisions differ substantially from section 86 of the Business
Corporation Act,' 7 0 which provides, in relevant part, that:
Circuit courts have full power to liquidate the assets and busi-
ness of a corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it appears:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the
corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the corporation is suffered
or threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and
have failed, for a period which includes at least 2 consecutive an-
nual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose term has
expired or would have expired upon the election of their succes-
sors; or
(3) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corpo-
ration are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
Such differences raise the question whether section 14(a) is intended
to provide the only procedure by which a shareholder of a close cor-
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (1975).
6151978]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
poration may seek judicial dissolution of a close corporation. It is un-
clear whether he may also seek liquidation of its assets and business
pursuant to section 86 of the Business Corporation Act. Unfortu-
nately, there is no readily apparent answer.
The first source of confusion stems from the fact that the Business
Corporation Act speaks of "power to liquidate the business and assets
of a corporation," 171 whereas the Close Corporation Act speaks of
"involuntary dissolution" of the corporation. 172  Under Illinois law,
liquidation refers to the process by which a corporation collects its
assets, pays or provides for its obligations, and distributes its re-
maining assets among its shareholders. 173  Dissolution refers to the
termination of the corporation's legal existence, which normally oc-
curs only after liquidation is completed. 174  Furthermore, under the
Business Corporation Act a court can order involuntary dissolution
only "upon complaint filed by the Attorney General,"1 75 and not in
an action by a shareholder. Thus by giving the court power to dis-
solve a close corporation in a suit by a shareholder, the Act makes a
definite change from prior Illinois law. The practical effect of such
change will probably be slight, since liquidation would, of necessity,
precede judicial dissolution and dissolution in most cases would occur
following judicial liquidation. 176 But the difference in terminology
between the two statutes makes it possible to argue that there are
two different proceedings between which a shareholder may choose.
A comparison of the grounds of dissolution/liquidation in the two
statutes creates further confusion. Both section 14(a)(1) of the Act and
section 86(a)(1) of the Business Corporation Act list deadlock among
the directors as grounds for dissolution/liquidation. Sections 14(a)(2)
and (3) also require, respectively, that any remedy provided in a
shareholders' agreement must have failed to eliminate such deadlock
and that there be such dissension among the shareholders "that the
business and affairs can no longer be conducted in the best interests
of the shareholders." It is unclear whether the latter requirement is
intended to be the same as the section 86(a)(1) requirement "that
irreparable injury to the corporation is suffered or threatened by rea-
son" of the deadlock. In any event, the inclusion of section 14(a)(2), in
171. Id.
172. Close Corporation Act § 14(a).
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.79 (1975).
174. Id. §§157.80, 157.81.
175. id. § 157.82. See also id. §§ 190-97.
176. The distinction is further blurred by the fact that the courts generally use the term
"dissolution" rather than "liquidation" in cases brought under § 86. See, e.g., Central Life Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill.2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957).
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the absence of a similar provision in section 86(a)(1), strongly supports
the argument that section 14(a) was intended to be exclusive and that
shareholders of close corporations should not be allowed to evade this
requirement by suing for liquidation under section 86.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the drafters of the Act
intended to deprive shareholders of close corporations of the grounds
for liquidation provided in sections 86(a)(2), (3) and (4).177 Thus the
absence of corresponding provisions in section 14(a) argues strongly
for allowing such shareholders to sue for liquidation under such pro-
visions.
In conclusion, Illinois courts probably will interpret the Act so as to
allow shareholders of close corporations to sue for liquidation under
sections 86(a)(2)(3) and (4), and possibly under section 86(a)(1), of the
Business Corporation Act. Such a result is not certain, however, and
the legislature would be well advised to amend the Act so as to
eliminate the confusion on this question.
Section 14(b) of the Act provides that, in any proceeding under
section 14(a):
[A]ny one or more shareholders desiring to continue the busi-
ness of a close corporation may avoid the dissolution of the corpo-
ration or the appointment of a trustee or receiver under this Sec-
tion 14 by electing in a written instrument filed in the proceeding
to purchase the shares of stock owned by the petitioner at a price
equal to their fair value. If a shareholder or shareholders making
such election are unable to reach an agreement with the petitioner
as to the fair value of his shares within 30 days after the filing of
such election, the court shall, upon said electing shareholders giv-
ing bond or other security in an amount fixed by the court, stay
the proceeding and proceed to determine the fair value of such
shares as of the close of the business on the day on which the
petition for the dissolution was filed. Upon determining the fair
value of such shares, the court shall set forth in its order directing
that the shares be purchased, the purchase price and the time
within which the payment shall be made, and may decree such
other terms and conditions of sale as it determines to be appro-
priate, including payment of the purchase price in installments
over a period of time and the allocation of shares among sharehold-
ers electing to purchase them. The petitioner shall be entitled to
interest at the legal rate on the purchase price of his shares from
177. Illinois courts have traditionally been more willing to liquidate corporations under these
provisions than under § 86(a)(1). W. MURDOCK, ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNO-
TATED 481-83 (2d ed. 1975). Thus denial of the grounds contained in such provisions would
substantially diminish the usefulness of the dissolution remedy.
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the date of filing of the election for a determination of fair value
and all other rights of the petitioner as an owner of the shares shall
terminate at such date. Upon full payment of the purchase price,
under the terms and conditions specified by the court, or at such
other time as may be ordered by the court, the petitioner shall
surrender the shares of stock to the purchasing shareholder or
shareholders. 178
It is not entirely clear from the wording of this provision whether
the election to purchase the petitioner's shares can be made only if
the court finds that dissolution is appropriate, or whether the election
may be made prior to a final decision on the dissolution issue.1 79  By
providing for staying the proceeding to determine the fair value of
the shares, the statute implies the latter interpretation. This interpre-
tation also appears desirable as a matter of policy. Buying out a
shareholder who wishes to obtain his share of the corporate assets
rather than continue in the business will reconcile in an equitable
manner the interests of such a shareholder with the interests of the
remaining shareholders, regardless of the appropriateness of judicial
dissolution.
Section 14(b) also raises an interesting question concerning the val-
uation of the petitioner's shares in a dissolution proceeding. Ques-
tions concerning the value of corporate shares have arisen most fre-
quently in the context of appraising the shares of shareholders who
have dissented from a merger or other change in corporate status.1 8 0
In such cases, the courts generally consider three major factors in
determining the value of the dissenter's shares: the per share value of
the corporation's net assets, the market value of the shares, and their
investment, or earnings, value. 181
178. This provision appears to be based on MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-603 (1974).
Similar provisions are found in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-216.A.3 (1977) (purchase of petitioner's
shares may be ordered at the court's discretion); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (1958) (not
limited to close corporations). For a discussion of the Maryland provision, see Bradley, A Com-
parative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J.
525, 545-47.
179. Compare § 14(b) of the Act with'AR IZ. REV. STAT § 10-216.B (1977), which explicitly
provides that the court may grant relief, including ordering purchase of the petitioners shares,
"even though the court does not find any of" the grounds for dissolution to be present.
180. See Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.32, §§ 157.70, 157.73 (1975);
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262 (1974).
181. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 472-74 (1975); Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 588, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106, 338 N.E.2d 614, 616
(1974); Brown v. Hedahl's-QB&R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 254 (N.D. 1971); Foglesong v.
Thurston Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 606, 610 (Okla. 1976); In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287,
292, 304 A.2d 694, 698 (1973). But see Stewart v. D.J. Stewart & Co., 37 IlI. App.3d 848, 346
N.E.2d 475 (1976).
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In general, the least weight is placed on the asset value of the
shares. This stems from the principle that "in an appraisal proceeding
. . . the shares must be valued on a going concern basis." 182 It is
also grounded on the fact that the dissenting shareholders are "enti-
tled to be paid for that which has been taken from . . ." them by the
corporate action from which they are dissenting, namely their "pro-
portionate interest in a going concern." 183 In the context of a going
concern, the liquidation value of assets is normally less important to a
shareholder than the market value or earnings value of his shares
because it is only through payment of dividends or sale of the shares
that he can realize a return on his investment. 184
In a dissolution proceeding under the Act, however, the petitioner
whose shares are purchased is being deprived not of his "proportion-
ate interest in a going concern," but of his right to a pro-rata distribu-
tion of the corporate assets. In such a case, the court should not
follow the method of valuation generally used in appraisal cases, but
should rely primarily on the value of the corporation's assets in valu-
ing the petitioner's shares. Any other approach might result in the
petitioner receiving substantially more or less for his shares than he
would have received on dissolution.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of section 14(b) of the Act is that it
provides the option to purchase the petitioner's shares only in actions
brought under section 14(a) of the Act. The value of section 14(b) lies
in the fact that it allows both the shareholders who wish to continue
the business and those who wish to withdraw from the business and
recover the value of their investment an opportunity to do so in an
equitable manner. Such a procedure is equally desirable regardless of
the grounds upon which dissolution is sought. The right to purchase
the petitioner's shares should not depend on whether the petitioner
alleges deadlock under section 14(a) or one of the grounds listed in
section 86(a) in his petition for dissolution or liquidation.
F. Effect on Close Corporations Not Electing
to Be Subject to the Act
As mentioned previously, the Act is applicable only to corporations
which elect to be subject to it. This raises a number of questions
182. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975).
Accord, In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 291, 304 A.2d 694, 697 (1973).
183. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
Accord, In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 487, 495, 178 N.E. 766, 769 (1931).
184. See Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 473 (Del. 1975).
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concerning the law applicable to close corporations which do not
make such an election.
A basic question is whether a shareholder agreement among
shareholders of a corporation not subject to the Act, such as that up-
held in Galler v. Galler, 185 would still be valid. It can be argued that
the legislature, by authorizing such agreements for only a specific
class of corporations, implicitly denied the use of such agreements to
shareholders of other corporations. Since, however, the Act provides
that "[t]he provisions of this Act shall not be deemed to repeal,
amend or modify any statute or rule of common law which is or
would be applicable to any corporation which is not a close corpora-
tion as herein defined," 186 it appears likely that such an agreement
still would be upheld.
This conclusion, however, merely raises more questions. Under the
terms of the Act, any such agreement must be noted on the face or
back of every certificate representing shares of the corporation. 187
Shareholders of corporations subject to the Act who enter into an
agreement which restricts the discretion of the directors become
subject to "the liability for managerial acts that is imposed by the
laws of this State upon directors."""8 Do agreements among
shareholders not subject to the Act create similar shareholder liabil-
ity? Must such agreements be noted on the certificates representing
the corporation's shares? The Close Corporation Act itself does not
impose such conditions. However, a court might do so on the
grounds of public policy, because either shareholder liability or nota-
tion of shareholder agreements on certificates is deemed necessary to
protect the shareholders, the public or the corporation's creditors.
Alternatively, such disclosure might be deemed necessary to prevent
corporations from evading such requirements by not electing to be
subject to the Act.
Another source of confusion is the listing of permissible restrictions
on transfer in section 3 of the Act. 18 9 The Business Corporation Act
contains no similar list of permissible restrictions, but merely states
that shares may be issued "with such designations, preferences, qual-
ifications, limitations, restrictions, and special or relative rights as
shall be stated in the articles of incorporation." 190 Thus the listing of
185. 32 1Il.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
186. Close Corporation Act § 16.
187. Id. § 8(a).
188. ld. 11l(c).
189. Id. § 3(a). See text accompanying note 120 supra.
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.32 § 157.14 (1975).
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permissible restrictions in the Act can be read as being more permis-
sive than prior law. It may imply that some or all of the restrictions
listed are unavailable to corporations not subject to the Act. 19'
This confusion could have been avoided if the Act had been made
applicable to all close corporations as defined therein without requir-
ing such corporations to elect to be subject to the Act. Such an ap-
proach would have had several advantages. First, it would remove all
doubts as to whether, and to what extent, shareholders of various
corporations would be able to enter into agreements concerning the
management of the corporation. Second, it would clearly impose vari-
ous protective provisions, such as legended certificates and
shareholder liability for managerial acts, upon all persons who elect to
take advantage of such provisions. Third, it would indicate more
clearly that the other provisions of the Act, such as management by
the shareholders, the shareholders' option to dissolve the corporation
and the option to purchase the petitioner's shares in a dissolution
proceeding, are available only to close corporations and not to pub-
licly held corporations. 192 At present, some close corporations can-
not take advantage of such provisions because they have not elected
to be subject to the Act. In contrast, a publicly held corporation, by
placing restrictions on its shares and electing to be subject to the Act,
might be able to utilize them.193  By defining the term "close corpo-
ration" more precisely 194 and by making such corporations subject to
the Act without the necessity of an election, the legislature could
191. Since restrictions on transfer have generally been upheld under Illinois law, see, e.g.
Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 327 F.2d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 1964); Vogel v. Melish, 31 Ill.2d
620, 625, 203 N.E.2d 411, 413 (1964), rehearing denied 31 Ill.2d 620, 203 N.E.2d 411 (1965);
Eggerson v. Brower Mfg. Co., 27 I11. App.3d 963, 327 N.E.2d 468 (1975) (abstract only), such
an argument appears unlikely to succeed, at least in cases involving types of restrictions which
have been previously upheld. Nevertheless, it would have been preferable to draft the statute
so as to avoid such confusion.
192. The need to "indicate clearly that statutes which have been enacted to provide for the
peculiar needs of the close corporation are absolutely unavailable to the public issue corpora-
tion" has been cited as a major reason for enacting a separate close corporation statute rather
than adding provisions useful to close corporations, but applicable to all corporations, to the
general corporation law. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 706.
193. See notes 128-129 and accompanying text supra.
194. Such a definition probably would specify a maximum number of shareholders for a close
corporation, place a restriction on public trading or offerings of its shares or both. See notes
122-129 and accompanying text supra. The definition need not necessarily be the same for all
purposes. For example, the Act could allow agreements concerning the management of the
corporation among the shareholders of any corporation whose shares are not listed on a stock
exchange or regularly traded over the counter, see statutes cited in note 114 supra, and restrict
management by the shareholders to corporations with no more than a specified number of
shareholders.
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establish clearly that, as a matter of public policy, the provisions of
the Act should be available only to corporations which are in fact
close corporations as that term is normally understood.
Nor does there appear to be any overwhelming policy reason for
requiring that a corporation elect to be subject to the Act and include
a statement that it is a close corporation in its articles of incorpora-
tion. According to one commentator, the policy behind including
such requirements in the Maryland and Delaware close corporation
statutes was ". . . to require notice to outsiders by charter an-
nouncement and to insure some degree of consent by shareholders to
fundamental changes in managerial structure."1 95  Notice to outsid-
ers, however, can be provided by other means. For example, the
inclusion of a provision for shareholder management, in the articles of
incorporation, puts outsiders on notice to the same degree as a state-
ment that a corporation is a close corporation. Moreover, the
shareholders can be protected adequately by legended certificates and
high or unanimous vote requirements for fundamental changes
whether or not an election to be a close corporation is required.
196
For all of the above reasons, the legislature should give serious
consideration to amendment of the Act so as to eliminate the re-
quirement that corporations taking advantage of its provisions must
elect to be subject to the Act and to make the Act applicable to all
close corporations as therein defined.
III. CONCLUSION
In many respects, the Illinois Act is an admirable attempt to deal
with the legal problems of the close corporation. The provisions au-
thorizing shareholders' agreements concerning the management of the
corporation, 197 management by shareholders rather than the board of
directors,' and granting shareholders an option to dissolve the cor-
poration at will or upon the occurrence of a specified contingency,' 99
195. Covington, supra note 7, at 194.
196. This would not, of course, provide notice to third parties of shareholders' agreements
not included in the articles of incorporation. Such notice is not, however, provided under the
Act, and, since such agreements are probably valid among shareholders of corporations not
subject to the Act, see text accompanying notes 185-186 supra, the Act's election procedures do
not even provide notice as to which corporations might have such agreements. Thus if notice to
third parties of shareholders' agreements is deemed desirable, it will be necessary to amend the
Act irregardless of whether the election requirement is eliminated.
197. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
198. Id.
199. See notes 167-169 and accompanying text supra.
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allow substantial flexibility in adjusting the corporate structure to the
needs and desires of the specific persons involved. In particular, such
provisions make it possible to protect the interests of minority
shareholders either by agreeing in advance as to corporate policy or
by giving such shareholders a veto over some or all corporate deci-
sions. The Act does not impose more stringent fiduciary duties on
controlling shareholders of close corporations except to the extent that
they assume directors' liability. 200 However, it may contribute to
such a development by "encourag[ing] more realistic and sympathetic
judicial treatment" of close corporations. 20 1 The grant to other
shareholders of an option to purchase the shares of the petitioner in a
judicial dissolution proceeding 202 should add substantially to the
ability of the courts to provide equitable solutions to conflicts among
shareholders of close corporations.
However, the Act also has serious deficiencies. A number of its
provisions are extremely vague. The provisions governing judicial dis-
solution,203 in particular, create considerable confusion as to what law
is applicable to corporations which elect to be subject to the Act.20 4
Furthermore, by requiring that corporations elect to be subject to its
provisions, the Act creates unnecessary confusion as to what law is
applicable to close corporations which do not elect to be subject to
it. 20 5
These deficiencies are particularly ironic in that one of the major
purposes of close corporation legislation is to "clarify the uncertainties
that still persist in certain areas of the law which vitally affect the
close corporation."-2 0 6  Rather than clarifying uncertainties, the Act
has to a large extent created new ones.
Fortunately, none of the problems of the Act appear to be insolu-
ble. In some cases, such as the ambiguity regarding the extent to
which the parties to a shareholders' agreement assume the liabilities
of directors,20 7 a relatively minor amendment would be sufficient. In
other cases, more extensive revisions may be necessary. Hopefully,
the legislature will be able to make the necessary changes in the near
future. Even in its present form, the Act should prove to be a valu-
200. See notes 69-95 and 158-160 and accompanying text supra.
201. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 706.
202. See notes 178-184 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 170-179 and accompanying text supra.
204. See notes 116-120 and accompanying text supra.
205. See notes 185-196 and accompanying text supra.
206. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 706.
207. See notes 158-160 and accompanying text supra.
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able tool to attorneys seeking more flexibility in adjusting the corpo-
rate structure to the needs of shareholders of close corporations. If
amended so as to eliminate the present ambiguities, the Act will
prove to be an even more valuable contribution to Illinois corporate
law.
